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In this article we provide a rationale for bankruptcy law that is based on the conflicts
among creditors that occur when a debtor’s liabilities exceed its assets.  In the absence of
a bankruptcy law, the private debt-collection remedies that creditors pursue when a debtor
is insolvent result in an ad hoc disposal of the debtor’s assets, thereby reducing the
aggregate value of creditors’ claims.  We show that coordination clauses can be used by
creditors in their loan agreements that will result in coordination, ex post.  Although all
creditors would benefit from including these clauses in their contracts, they nevertheless
choose not to in precisely those circumstances in which it is desirable to coordinate.  This
is an important insight because previous theories supporting a role for bankruptcy law are
based on the notion that creditors want to contract about bankruptcy, but cannot.  In
contract, we demonstrate that creditors will choose not to coordinate ex ante, even though
it is in their best interest ex post.
We also examine a variety of other contractual mechanisms, including covenants and
seniority, and show that although including these terms in loan contracts can improve
creditors’ incentives to write coordination clauses, they do so only in special
circumstances.  Our analysis of creditor conflicts and the potential for private contracting
remedies provides an economic rationale for the existence of a bankruptcy law that
mandates ex post coordination among the creditors of an insolvent debtor.PROTECTION FOR WHOM?
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CREDITOR CONFLICTS IN BANKRUPTCY
JEL Subject Codes:  G33, K10
ABSTRACT
In this article we provide a rationale for bankruptcy law that is based on the conflicts
among creditors that occur when a debtor’s liabilities exceed its assets. In the absence of a
bankruptcy law, the private debt-collection remedies that creditors pursue when a debtor is
insolvent result in an ad hoc disposal of the debtor’s assets, thereby reducing the aggregate value
of creditors’ claims.  We show that coordination clauses can be used by creditors in their loan
agreements that will result in coordination, ex post.  Although all creditors would benefit from
including these clauses in their contracts, they nevertheless choose not to in precisely those
circumstances in which it is desirable to coordinate.  This is an important insight because
previous theories supporting a role for a bankruptcy law are based on the notion that creditors
want to contract about bankruptcy, but cannot.  In contrast, we demonstrate that creditors will
choose not to coordinate ex ante, even though it is in their best interest ex post.
We also examine a variety of other contractual mechanisms, including covenants and
seniority, and show that although including these terms in loan contracts can improve creditors’
incentives to write coordination clauses, they do so only in special circumstances.  Our analysis
of creditor conflicts and the potential for private contracting remedies provides an economic
rationale for the existence of a bankruptcy law that mandates ex post coordination among the
creditors of an insolvent debtor.
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1.  Introduction
Why do bankruptcy laws exist?  Certainly, a fundamental role of government in any
society is to provide an effective mechanism for enforcing contracts.  Consequently, civil courts
regularly interpret and enforce a wide variety of private contracts, including labor contracts, loan
agreements, leasing agreements, and other performance contracts.  Yet, most developed
countries have special laws, with their own court systems, to resolve defaults on financial
contracts.
In this paper we show that in the absence of a bankruptcy law, the ex post conflicts that
arise among creditors create a social welfare loss because these conflicts result in an inefficient
liquidation of the debtor’s assets.  Creditors can write “coordination clauses” in their contracts ex
ante to avoid these conflicts, and doing so results in the first-best outcome.  Nevertheless, we
show that creditors (and their debtor) will choose not to write such contracts in precisely the
circumstances in which they are welfare improving.  We then demonstrate that contractual
devices such as covenants, seniority, and collateral are incapable of resolving these conflicts in
all circumstances.  Furthermore, even when these contractual remedies do resolve these creditor
conflicts, they inflict their own externalities such as monitoring costs or risk shifting.  We argue
that the unwillingness of creditors to privately contract about bankruptcy suggests a welfare-
improving role for a bankruptcy law that mandates ex post coordination among the creditors of
an insolvent firm.
The recognition of ex post creditor conflicts in our analysis is certainly not novel.  Legal
scholars have argued that the existence of bankruptcy law is a response to the common pool
problem:
2
The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a normative
matter and as a positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies
may be bad for the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go
around. (Jackson, 1988, p. 10)
In other words, it would generally be socially desirable for creditors to coordinate their debt-
collection activities, thereby increasing “the size of the pie” to be distributed.  Nevertheless, once
                                                
2 See also Picker (1992), Posner (1986), and White (1990).Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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the firm has reached insolvency, a creditor’s most profitable course of action is to stake a claim
on a portion of the debtor’s assets that is sufficiently large to make him whole. The resulting
first-come, first-served ordering of creditors’ claims leads to significant losses because the
debtor’s assets are liquidated in an ad hoc manner in order to satisfy individual creditor’s
claims.
3  This externality is the essence of the common pool problem.
4
On its own, however, this justification for bankruptcy law is incomplete because it does
not explain why creditors fail to write contracts ex ante that effect a coordinated liquidation.
Legal scholars have recognized this and argue that creditors would write these contracts ex ante,
but that they are unable to do so.
5  For example, Posner (1986) writes:
All of these problems [ex post creditor conflicts] can be solved, in principle, by
transactions among the creditors; but if there are many creditors, the costs of these
transactions may well be prohibitive.  The alternative is bankruptcy… (p. 376)
Creditors do, however, write extensive covenants into their loan agreements that protect
them from the actions of other creditors. Furthermore, creditors often work together in making
loans to a single firm, making their contracts contingent on one another.  Thus, it is important to
investigate if there are conditions under which creditors will contract about bankruptcy ex ante,
and if creditors do not write such contracts, to understand why they do not.  These questions are
central to our analysis.
We analyze a model in which creditors can write enforceable coordination clauses in
their loan agreements that commit themselves to coordinate ex post.  Despite that fact that we
                                                
3 The optimality of this strategy follows from its legality.  See Baird (1983) for a general discussion of this type of
“grab law.”
4 The common pool problem is most typically illustrated in the context of share cropping and is familiar to
economists as an example of a prisoners’ dilemma.  Jackson (1988) describes it as it relates to harvesting fish from a
pond.  A sole owner of the pond (ostensibly a sole owner of the rights to fish the pond) may choose to harvest, say,
half of the fish each season to ensure the perpetuation of the crop and an annual cash flow, instead of harvesting all
of the fish (and all of the cash flow) this season and none in the future.  However, if there were 1000 individuals
with rights to fish the pond, a collective (coordinated) harvest of half of the fish population each season is difficult to
obtain.  The reason is that it is privately optimal for an individual to harvest slightly more than 1/2000
th of the fish
population this season (we are assuming equal ownership rights) because it brings him a bigger profit and would
have a negligible impact on next year’s fish population.   This strategy is optimal for every individual, and so the
entire fish population is extinguished with dispatch.
5 Schwartz (1997b) sumarizes three factors that limit creditors’ abilities to contract about bankruptcy:  i) multiple
creditors, ii)  sequentially contracting creditors, and iii) heterogeneous creditor preferences.  His analysis presumes
that creditors would want to coordinate.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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assume that there are no costs to writing these contracts, creditors will choose not to include
these clauses in precisely those circumstances in which they will be needed to resolve an ex post
coordination problem.  As a result, a mandatory bankruptcy system that forces creditors to
coordinate their liquidation activities can be welfare improving.
The root cause of this incentive problem is a time-inconsistency problem induced by the
sequential nature of a debtor’s contracts with creditors.  At the time a creditor contracts with a
debtor an existing creditor’s contract is already fixed, which encourages its exploitation by the
subsequent creditor and the debtor.  If the subsequent creditor is better off taking his chances by
running the firm than it is sharing the debtor’s assets in a coordinated liquidation, then it will
charge a lower interest rate.  This lower loan interest rate also means that the firm will have no
incentive to encourage the second creditor to coordinate liquidation.
We also show that while contract terms such as covenants, seniority, or collateral can
penetrate the time-inconsistency problem by increasing creditors’ incentives to write
coordination clauses in their contracts, such contract terms are themselves costly to enforce.  As
a result, they will be used to resolve ex post coordination problems only in special cases.
Although our model provides an economic rationale for the existence of mandatory
bankruptcy institutions, it is important to keep in mind that it has little to say about the specific
structure of bankruptcy law in the United States or other developed countries.  “Bankruptcy” in
the context of our model simply requires that all creditors coordinate their activities to liquidate
or otherwise dispose of the firm’s assets.
6  Thus, our model provides support for a basic
bankruptcy system that imposes some type of an automatic stay on creditors—preventing them
from pursuing private remedies outside of the collective procedure—and incorporates preference
law provisions—preventing some creditors from being paid off by a debtor on the eve of
bankruptcy, which would allow them to effectively opt out of the collective process.
Legal scholars have previously analyzed the question of whether creditors might contract
about default resolution ex ante, thereby eliminating the need for a special bankruptcy law.  For
                                                
6 Note that this may entail selling the firm as a going concern or allowing it to continue under existing management.
The key feature is that creditors are prevented from unilaterally foreclosing on the firm’s assets.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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example, Adler (1993) argues that a hypothetical contracting arrangement that he labels
“chameleon equity” would obviate the need for a bankruptcy law that imposes large costs
through ex post asset valuation and distribution efforts.
7  Schwartz (1997a, 1997b) also illustrates
the ability of private contracting to achieve ex post coordination among creditors.
8
The arguments in Adler (1993, 1994, 1997) and in Schwartz (1997a, 1997b), however,
rest on the assumption that creditors desire a coordinated liquidation, and therefore, would
choose to write the necessary contracts if the direct contracting costs were low enough.  This
assumption loses sight of the fact that the common pool problem that bankruptcy solves arises
precisely because creditors do not have the incentive to coordinate their liquidation activities.
Our analysis illustrates the strict conditions under which creditors will choose to write contracts
that effect coordination, and what those contracts look like.
According to our analysis, a bankruptcy law is socially desirable not because it protects
debtors from creditors or creditors from debtors, but rather because it protects creditors from one
another.  To our knowledge, this conclusion is novel in the economics literature.  Although other
authors have looked at the conflicts that can arise among creditors during bankruptcy, none have
used these conflicts as an explanation for why bankruptcy law exists in the first place.
For example, Bulow and Shoven (1978), White (1980), and Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991) argue that when a firm is in financial distress, its equity holders and its bank-debt holders
have an incentive to restructure their contract to expropriate value from senior public debt
                                                
7 See also Adler (1994, 1997).   Chameleon equity is prioritized equity with common equity holders at the bottom of
the priority chain, and preferred equity holders with fixed claims situated in higher priority classes.  Firms would
issue no traditional debt.  “If a firm were to become insolvent, and default on its obligations the common equity
class would vanish as would the fixed claims of the next lowest investor class, which would then become the new
common equity class.”  (p. 312)
While there are several conceptual difficulties with this particular contracting mechanism, we concur with such
a contract’s ability to resolve creditor conflicts.  After all, if the firm has no debt, then there will be no creditors with
conflicting interests, and, thus, no need for a bankruptcy law.  In fact, the chameleon equity contract assumes away
the ex post coordination problem, and, thus, the need for a bankruptcy law (“no investor would have the right
individually to collect a fixed obligation from the firm.” [p. 312]) .
8 Schwartz (1997a) argues for removing current legal restrictions on a firm’s ability to choose, ex ante, its preferred
bankruptcy procedure.  He shows that under some conditions, firms and their creditors will contract about
bankruptcy efficiently ex ante, provided they have a carefully chosen menu of bankruptcy options.  In a similar vein,
Schwartz (1997b) shows that if financial covenants were enforceable ex post, then an appropriate priority structure
would result in an optimal liquidation procedure in the absence of bankruptcy law.  He uses this result to argue in
favor of making financial covenants in loan agreements binding on subsequent loan agreements.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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holders.
9  Franks and Nyborg (1996) argue that conflicting incentives among creditors can arise
because of their different private control rights, leading to inefficient ex post liquidations.
Unlike our analysis, however, none of these analyses consider the initial pricing of debt claims
nor do they explain why private agreements established ex ante cannot solve these conflicts
without a special bankruptcy law.
Differences in creditor incentives can also explain why firms borrow from multiple
investors (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Green and Juster, 1994), the maturity and seniority
attributes of a firm’s capital structure (Diamond 1991, 1993), and creditor monitoring incentives
(Rajan and Winton, 1995).  However, none of these authors analyze how conflicts between
creditors can explain the existence of a bankruptcy law
Brown (1989) is perhaps closet in spirit to our model, in that he attempts to explain why
bankruptcy law can be beneficial.  He assumes that the firm is financially distressed but
economically viable (i.e., the debtor is solvent, which means there is no common pool problem)
so that restructuring its debt is socially desirable, and then models the Chapter 11 reorganization
process.  He shows how its structure mitigates holdout problems among a firm’s debt holders,
thus allowing reorganization to occur.  However, he does not attempt to explain why the firm and
its creditors do not privately agree to this structure on their own, eliminating the need for a
special law.
In the next section, we discuss the role of bankruptcy law with a particular emphasis on
how an insolvent firm’s assets would be divided in the absence of such a law.  Using this
background, in section 3 we develop a model of financial contracting in which creditors choose
not to write simple coordination clauses in their contracts despite the fact that doing so is Pareto
improving.  In section 4 we show that covenants can offer a solution to this coordination
problem, but only in special cases, and only at a cost.  We also examine the impact of priority on
coordination incentives and show that either seniority or collateral can effect coordination, but,
as with covenants, only in special cases and only at a cost.  As a result, mandatory bankruptcy
                                                
9 See also Mooradian (1994).Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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laws Pareto dominate any of these private contracting alternatives.  Section 5 concludes, while
proofs of all results can be found in the Appendix.
2.  A World without Bankruptcy
The task we have set for ourselves in this paper is a tricky one.  In order to examine
whether or not creditors would coordinate their liquidation activities on their own, it is necessary
to imagine a world in which bankruptcy law does not exit.  Doing this requires precisely
describing what rights creditors have in the remaining legal environment.  That is, in the absence
of bankruptcy law what legal rights do creditors have when a debtor defaults on its obligations?
In considering this question, we note that debt collection regularly takes place outside the
realm of bankruptcy, even in the current legal environment.  When a debtor defaults on its
obligations, its creditors may file suit in civil courts in order to obtain repayment.  Whether it be
by granting the creditor claim to some of the debtor’s assets or garnishing the debtor’s wages, the
civil court effectively acts to enforce the private debt agreement.  The important point to note is
that all such debt-collection activities take place outside the realm of bankruptcy law.  Indeed, it
is often to avoid or postpone such judgments that debtors file for bankruptcy.
If a firm has only one creditor, this private action is the end of the story.  When a firm has
multiple creditors, however, this private debt-collection process develops into a “first-come,
first-served” feast on the firm.  In other words, the first creditor to take action against the firm
will be the first to obtain relief; later creditors will gain possession of whatever assets remain, if
any.  In essence, when the firm becomes insolvent each creditor is on its own to collect what it is
owed, and cares little how its actions might affect the firm’s other creditors.
It is this conflict between creditors that gives rise to the need for a separate bankruptcy
law.
The grab rules of non-bankruptcy law and their allocation of assets on the basis of
first-come, first-served create an incentive on the part of individual creditors,
when they sense that a debtor may have more liabilities than assets, to get in line
today (by, for example getting a sheriff to execute on the debtors equipment),
because if they do not, they run the risk of getting nothing.  This decision by
numerous individual creditors, however, may be the wrong decision for theCreditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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creditors as a group.  Even though the debtor is insolvent, they might be better off
if they held the assets together.  Bankruptcy provides a way to make these diverse
individuals act as one by imposing a collective and compulsory proceeding on
them.  (Jackson, 1988, pp.12-13)
In the next section, we build a formal model of lending and default consistent with this
non-bankruptcy debt-collection process.  If the firm is able to repay its creditors, it does so and
keeps the balance of its assets.  If the firm is insolvent, however, each creditor has the
opportunity to pursue private debt-collection activities.  In the absence of collective action, the
first creditor to observe that the firm is insolvent becomes the first to request repayment and
receives the lion’s share of the firm’s assets; the other creditor receives only what is left after
paying off the first creditor.
Against this backdrop, we show that a mandatory collective bankruptcy procedure can be
welfare improving.  In particular, we demonstrate that even though creditors are able to write
contracts that pre-commit themselves to coordinate liquidation, they will often choose not to do
so.  In contrast, bankruptcy law avoids these costs of inefficiently distributing the firm’s assets,
by ensuring that all creditors coordinate their liquidation activities.
3.  A Model of Creditor Conflict
A.  The Structure of the Model
We employ a two-period model in which a firm contracts with two creditors.  Creditors
contract with the firm sequentially at time 0.  We assume that there are no contracting costs.
This allows the model to focus more sharply on creditors’ incentives to coordinate, rather than
their ability to do so.  Creditor i, where  } , { B A i∈∈∈∈ , lends the firm  i L  dollars in return for  i R  to be
paid from the firm’s cash flow, v ~ , in period 2.  Both the firm and its creditors behave as if they
were risk neutral, and all act as profit maximizers.  We assume the  lending market is perfectly
competitive; all social surplus accrues to the firm as profit, denoted by π =.  Information about v ~
is symmetric but incomplete.  At the time of initial contracting, both the debtor and its creditors
know that  H v v ==== ~  with probability q; with probability (1 – q),  L v v ==== ~ , where  0 > > L H v v .
During the life of the outstanding credit, creditors receive new information about the preciseCreditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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value of v ~ .
10  We designate this point as time  1 = t .  The sequence in which creditors receive
this information is potentially very important.  Let  i p  be the probability that creditor i learns v ~
first, where  1 = + B A p p .  The order of events in our model is depicted in  Figure 1.
Conditional upon observing the realization of v ~  at  1 = t , a creditor may choose to allow
the debtor to continue or it may initiate a liquidation.
11  We assume that the parameters of the
model are such that both creditors will want to liquidate the firm early (i.e., at  1 = t ) whenever
L v v = ~  but not when  H v v = ~ .  Sufficient conditions for this to be true are  B A H R R v + ≥  and
B A L L L v + < ; when  L v v = ~ , the firm is insolvent.
In a liquidation, creditor i has two options.  Either it can either “run the firm,” unilaterally
staking a claim equal to  i L  on the debtor’s assets, or it can coordinate its liquidation activities
with the other creditor.  When creditors coordinate the liquidation of the firm, it can be sold for
its entire net present value,  L v , and each creditor receives a pro rata share of the proceeds (unless
their contracts call for an alternative prioritization of claims).  Define  ) ( B A i i L L L + = θ  as
lender i’s claim on the firm’s assets when they coordinate and share pro-rata, and note that
1 = + B A θ θ .
12  Thus, if creditors coordinate, creditor i receives  L i v θ  in a liquidation.
In contrast, when creditors unilaterally run the firm, the debtor’s assets are liquidated in
an ad hoc manner, which may prevent them from being deployed at their highest-valued use.  For
example, certain combinations of the debtor’s assets may fetch higher valuations than others:
Custom-designed manufacturing equipment may be sold at a higher price as a unit than if each
piece is sold separately.  Similarly, the order in which assets are sold can impact their value:  The
execution of a creditor’s claim on a debtor’s warehouse may force its contents to be sold at fire-
sale prices; machine tools or production equipment might be prematurely sold to meet an
individual creditor’s claim, leaving for the rest of the claimants poorly functioning machinery or
inventories of partially completed products.
                                                
10 More generally, one could imagine that the creditors learn the expected value of the firm’s cash flows, as in
Diamond (1993).
11 Although we refer to this as “liquidating” the firm, it is entirely possible that the best use of these assets is to sell
them as a whole to new owners.  Liquidation of the assets in our model refers only to their removal from the control
of the firm’s original owners to be redeployed at their highest-valued use.  Such use may be either a piecemeal
liquidation or a “restructuring.”
12 This assumes that there is no accrued interest between t = 0 and t = 1.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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To model this problem, we assume a fixed fraction c of the firm’s value is destroyed
when creditors do not coordinate liquidation.  This cost simply measures the externality created
by the ad hoc liquidation of the debtor’s assets.  If creditor i is the first to observe  L v v ==== ~ , he will
receive } ), 1 ( min{ i L L c v −  if he runs the firm, while the other creditor receives the residual,
} 0 , ) 1 ( max{ i L L c v −−−− −−−− .
Because the lending market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, social welfare is
measured by firm profit:
) ( B A H R R v q − − = π . (1)
Thus, social welfare is maximized by whichever contractual arrangements minimize the total
face value of the firm’s debt,  B A R R + .
Given this structure, we can state the first-best outcome that obtains when both creditors
coordinate their liquidation activities.  In this case, the lenders’ zero profit conditions are
B A i L v q qR i L i i , , ) 1 ( = = − + θ . (2)













B A L H L L v q qv − − − + = ) 1 (
* π ,( 4 )
where “stars” indicate the first-best equilibrium values.
B.  The Ex Post Coordination Problem
Once the firm is insolvent, both creditors will prefer running the firm as long as the
deadweight cost of an inefficient liquidation is not too high.  To see this, note that upon
observing  L v v ==== ~  creditor i will run the firm as long as its payoff from doing so exceeds that
from coordinating with the other creditor:
L i i L v L c v θ > − } ), 1 ( min{ . (5)
This gives us:
RESULT 1:  Once the firm is insolvent, each creditor prefers to run the firm if and only if theCreditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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deadweight cost of doing so is smaller than the fraction of the firm’s assets owed to the
other creditor; i.e., if  i c − < θ .
This result is simply a formalization of the point made by legal scholars that creditors
will often make inefficient decisions once the firm is in financial distress.  When deciding
whether to run the firm, a creditor compares the costs associated with inefficient liquidation,
L cv , with the amount it will loose to the other creditor if it coordinates liquidation,  L iv − θ .
Given that running the firm entails the deadweight cost  L cv , both the debtor and its
creditors would benefit from writing contracts that effect coordination.  However, we show next
that coordination is achieved ex ante only when it is unnecessary—that is, only when creditors
would coordinate ex post anyway.
C.  The Ex Ante Coordination Problem
Recall that creditors write their contracts sequentially in period 0, and are thus unable to
write contracts directly with one another.  Nevertheless, creditors are able to write conditions
into their loan agreements that allow them to make to commitments to each other.  In particular,
each creditor can include an enforceable “coordination clause” in its loan agreement mandating
that, in the event of insolvency, it will coordinate any liquidation actions with the other
creditor.
13  It is important to note that such a clause does not force the other creditor to
coordinate as well.
14  Rather, it merely commits the creditor using the clause to coordinate
should it be the first to observe  L v v ==== ~ .
Without loss of generality, let creditor A be the first to contract with the firm.  Because
the loan market is perfectly competitive, creditor A will include any loan terms (such as a
coordination clause) that lower the interest rate it must charge to earn zero expected profits.
Thus, in writing its own contract A must anticipate the terms that will be included in B’s contract,
including the possibility that B will not write a coordination clause.  To determine the terms of
                                                
13 More specifically, we assume that by incorporating a coordination clause into its contract, a creditor commits
itself to paying other creditors their pro rata share of any proceeds it receives from a unilateral liquidation of the
firm.  As a result, any creditor incorporating such a clause into its contract will have an incentive to ensure that the
firm is liquidated in the most efficient manner possible.
14 A coordination clause requiring coordination (or requiring anything else, including subordination) by subsequent
creditors is not enforceable under  U.S.  law.  We discuss this further below.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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A’s contract, we must first analyze B’s.
The question to address is whether or not a coordination clause will be included in
creditor B’s loan contract.  Because the terms of A’s contract are fixed by the time the second
contract is written, competition causes creditor B and the firm that reaps the rewards of that
competition to have less incentive to coordinate.
PROPOSITION 1:  The second creditor will write a coordination clause if and only if  A c θ ≥ .
This proposition holds regardless of whether creditor A incorporates a coordination
clause in his loan agreement, and its intuition is straightforward.  The cost to B to coordinate is
the fraction of the firm’s liquidation value that will be given to A should B be the first to observe
v ~ ; this equals  L Av θ .  As long as this cost is less than the deadweight loss associated with
inefficient liquidation,  L cv , creditor B incorporates a coordination clause into its loan agreement
because this allows it to charge the firm a lower interest rate.
Comparing the conditions in Proposition 1 and Result 1 illustrates that a coordination
clause will not be included in B’s contract precisely when it would be needed.  That is,
coordination clauses on their own would effect coordination only in cases in which an ex ante
solution is not required because both creditors are willing to coordinate ex post.
The most important thing to note about Proposition 1 is that creditor B chooses not to
write a coordination clause into its contract.  There are no contracting costs that prevent creditor
B from writing such a clause.  Instead, the reason the clause is not included is because the
creditor is ensured a higher payoff if the clause is not included than if it is.
One might suspect that Proposition 1 would imply that creditor A will likewise refuse to
include a coordination clause in its contract.  After all, if creditor B is going to run ex post,
creditor A might as well get in on the act.  As it turns out, creditor A will always coordinate in a
competitive lending market.
RESULT 2:  The first creditor’s contract will always include a coordination clause.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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Regardless of what ultimately happens in the second creditor’s contract, the first creditor can
charge a lower interest rate if it agrees to coordinate.  Doing so saves the firm  L Acv p q) 1 ( −  in
expected liquidation costs.
With these results we can now calculate the equilibrium outcome when creditors are able
to write coordination clauses into their loan agreements.  If  A c θ ≥ , coordination clauses will be
included in both loan agreements, and the first-best outcome results.  If instead  A c θ < , creditor
A will rationally anticipate that the second contract will not incorporate a coordination clause and
demand
q
L c v p v p q L
R
B L B L A A B
B
}] 0 , ) 1 ( max{ )[ 1 ( − − + − −
= ′ θ
. (6)
The face value of the second creditor’s debt will then be
q
L c v p v p q L
R
B L B L B A B
B




c v p q L L v q qv L B B A L H ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − − − + = ′ π . (8)
As a consequence, the social welfare loss that occurs if the second creditor does not coordinate is
equal to
c v p q L B ) 1 (
* − = ′ − π π .( 9 )
The expected cost of an inefficient liquidation represented in (9), along with the fact that
coordination clauses are never able to effect coordination whenever this cost exists, provides the
basic rationale for a bankruptcy law.
PROPOSITION  2:  A bankruptcy law that requires creditors to coordinate their liquidation
activities improves social welfare.
It is important to emphasize what this result does not imply.  In particular, Proposition 2
says nothing about the relative efficiency of Chapter 11 reorganization procedures, which have
been a primary focus of most economic analyses of bankruptcy.
15  Bankruptcy law in the context
                                                
15 Aghion and Bolton (1992), Bebchuk (1991), Bebchuk and Chang (1992), Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender (1998),
Berlin and Mester (1992), Eberhart and Senbet (1993), Harris and Raviv (1995), and Longhofer (1997) are allCreditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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of our model is much more abstract, incorporating only the basic feature of coordination among
creditors when the firm is unable to meet its debt obligations.  Other important questions such as
whether incumbent management should be allowed to maintain control over the firm during a
reorganization or under what circumstances a firm should be liquidated or reorganized are
beyond the scope of this paper.
So far, we have only considered the ability of simple coordination clauses to effect
coordination.  In the next section we examine the potential of several other contractual solutions.
4.  Covenants, Seniority, and Collateral as Mechanisms for Coordination
As we have seen, on their own creditors will be unwilling to write private contracts that
include coordination clauses in precisely those circumstances in which doing so is Pareto
improving.  Of course, there are a number of other contractual terms that may also have an
impact on creditor incentives to include such coordination clauses in their debt agreements.  In
this section, we consider three common alternative contracting arrangements: covenants,
seniority, and collateral.  We describe the instances in which each of these contracting devices
can effect coordination.  As we show, each of them is capable of resolving creditor conflicts only
in special cases and only at a cost.  Thus, we reconfirm throughout this section our conclusion
that a bankruptcy law that mandates coordination is socially desirable.
A.  Coordination Covenants
One possible solution to the creditor conflict is for the initial creditor to write a
“coordination covenant” into its loan agreement.  This covenant stipulates that A’s loan contract
will be in default unless creditor B includes a coordination clause in its loan agreement.  As
before, this covenant cannot impose coordination on the second creditor.  Instead, it gives the
first creditor an “out,” in that it can call its loan should it observe the firm enter into a non-
coordinating contract with the second creditor.
In this respect, coordination covenants bear much resemblance to “seniority covenants”
                                                                                                                                                            
examples that examine the conflict between a debtor and a single creditor with respect to some particular aspect of
bankruptcy law.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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that are a common feature of actual loan agreements (and that we will examine next).  Contrary
to the language that is often used to describe financial contracts, there is no such thing as a
“seniority clause” in loan agreements.  Rather, senior lenders include covenants requiring that
subsequent lenders subordinate their loans.  If a senior lender learns of a violation of this
covenant, he may declare the loan in default.  Alternatively, a creditor can write a “subordination
clause” that subordinates its claim to others.
The logic behind this practice follows from the idea that a contract should not be binding
on any individual who was not a party to the writing of that contract.  To enforce a seniority
clause on a future creditor who had no knowledge of that clause would be fundamentally unfair.
Such contract provisions are not enforceable under current U.S. case law.  Thus, our assumption
that covenants contained in the first creditor’s contract are unenforceable against the second
creditor is consistent with this general principle.
This does not imply, however, that the first creditor is wholly without recourse should the
second loan agreement fail to incorporate a coordination clause, since the first creditor may call
its loan should this breech occur.  The creditor’s ability to enforce coordination through this
covenant, however, comes at a cost, since it requires monitoring the subsequent debt transaction.
We model this by assuming that creditor A must expend k > 0 to monitor the firm’s second debt
agreement.  To simplify the analysis, we further assume that by paying this cost, A can ensure
with probability one that B includes a coordination clause in its loan agreement.
A covenant equilibrium is characterized by both creditors using coordination clauses,
with creditor A enforcing this outcome through the use of a coordination covenant that requires
monitoring B’s loan contract.  Under this scenario,
q
v q k L
R
L A A cov
A





L B B cov
B
θ ) 1 ( − −
= , (11)
and
k L L v q qv B A L H
cov − − − − + = ) 1 ( π . (12)
Clearly, the first-best outcome dominates this covenant equilibrium because of the monitoringCreditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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cost k.  As shown in Proposition 1, however, when  A c θ <  the first-best cannot be attained.  In
this case, a covenant equilibrium will be preferred if and only if  π π ′ ≥
cov , which is equivalent to
c v p q k L B ) 1 ( − ≤ . (13)
In other words, a covenant equilibrium maximizes social welfare whenever the deadweight cost
of monitoring is less than the expected loss associated with having creditor B run the firm.
This covenant equilibrium is only sustainable if creditor A finds is privately optimal to
monitor B’s loan agreement to ensure that it too includes a coordination clause.  Fortunately, it is
straightforward to verify that A will monitor B’s loan contract whenever (13) holds.  To see this
note that A will have an incentive to monitor whenever
k v p q L c v p q L A B B L B − − ≤ − − − θ ) 1 ( ] 0 , ) 1 ( max[ ) 1 ( (14)
If A does not monitor B’s contract, then Proposition 1 implies that B’s contract will not contain a
coordination clause.  If this is the case, the left hand side of (14) represents A’s expected payoff
if B observes  L v v ==== ~  first.  If, however, A does monitor, B’s contract will include a coordination
clause and A’s expected return when B learns first of the firm’s financial condition is given by
the right-hand side of (14).
16
The inequality (14) can be simplified to
) )( 1 ( B L B L B L v c v q p k + − − ≤ θ . (15)
Recalling that  ) ( B A B B L L L + = θ  and  B A L L L v + < , it is easy to see that this restriction on k is
less stringent than that given in expression (13).  In other words, whenever it is welfare
improving to include a coordination covenant in A’s contract, A will have the incentive to follow
through with the requisite monitoring.
There are two points to stress concerning the use of coordination covenants.  First,
although they can effect coordination in some circumstances in which it would fail otherwise,
there is still a significant range of parameter values for which coordination covenants are too
costly and will not be used.  In this range, creditor B’s contract will not include a coordination
clause, and the social loss in (9) will result.  This loss is avoided in a regime in which a
                                                
16 Note that if A learns of the firm’s financial condition first then his payoff is the same regardless of whether or not
he monitors because he has agreed to a coordination clause.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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bankruptcy law mandates ex post coordination.
Second, even when coordination covenants can effect ex post coordination, the fact that
monitoring these covenants is costly implies that such an equilibrium is a second-best outcome.
A bankruptcy law that mandates that creditors coordinate with one another would avoid this
costly monitoring, and thereby improve social welfare.
17
PROPOSITION 3:  When  A c θ <  and the cost of monitoring is sufficiently low ( c v p q k L B ) 1 ( − ≤ ), a
covenant equilibrium will obtain; coordination is effected at a cost k.  Nevertheless, a
bankruptcy law that requires creditors to coordinate their liquidation activities improves
social welfare.
The ideas discussed in this section are illustrated in Figure 2.  This figure shows the
possible outcomes that result for various combinations of c and k.  For  A c θ ≥ , creditor B will
coordinate its liquidation effort, and the first-best equilibrium outcome is achieved, with the firm
earning 
* π  (Result 1).  For  A c θ < , voluntary coordination will not work.  Nevertheless, if
c v p q k L B ) 1 ( − ≤ , the costs of monitoring a coordination covenant will be small enough that it
will be a solution, and firm profit (social welfare) will be 
cov π .  On the other hand, if this
monitoring cost is too large ( c v p q k L B ) 1 ( − > ), social welfare will be higher without
coordination (firm profit is π ′ ).  In any event, for  A c θ <  social welfare would be improved by a
mandatory bankruptcy law that ensures a coordinated liquidation.
B.  Seniority for the First Creditor
An alternative contractual device that may affect lender coordination incentives is
priority.  One such priority assignment would be to grant the first creditor seniority over the
firm’s assets.  Thus, when the firm is liquidated, its assets are first used to repay creditor A up to
the value of its claim,  A L .  Any residual is then used to pay off creditor B.  This “me-first” rule
was first described by Fama and Miller (1972) and is discussed extensively in White (1980).
This priority structure arises out of a creditors’ desire to protect its claim from dilution by
                                                
17 It may be tempting to recoil at this statement and instead suggest the notion that the bankruptcy process is itself
costly.  It is.  But as we discuss in the conclusion, the costs associated with valuing and distributing the debtor’s
assets arise regardless of whether liquidation is effected privately or through a court-run bankruptcy.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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subsequent creditors.  Granting the first creditor seniority over the firm’s assets ensures that the
second creditor cannot expropriate any value from the first creditor’s claim.
In attempting to grant creditor A a senior claim on the firm’s assets, two problems
become immediately apparent.  The first is the fact that priority for either creditor is meaningless
unless coordination is achieved.  In other words, unless B can be forced to coordinate liquidation
when he is the first to observe the firm in financial distress, creditor A’s senior position provides
him no protection.  This is because “seniority” is not enforceable; as discussed above, creditors
may voluntarily subordinate themselves, but cannot have this junior status forced upon them
without their consent.
18
As a result, as with the coordination covenant, creditor A cannot unilaterally make itself
senior over creditor B.  Instead, A can only write a seniority covenant that stipulates that B must
subordinate its claim.
19  This may seem like a subtle distinction, but it imposes the burden of
ensuring the preservation of its priority on the senior creditor.  That is, the seniority covenant,
like the coordination covenant, does not restrict the firm and future creditors from writing
contracts that have equal (or higher) priority to the existing creditor.  The seniority covenant
simply places in default the debt to which it is attached if a subsequent creditor does not
subordinate; in order to ensure this priority, the senior creditor must monitor all future creditors.
Assuming that the cost of monitoring a seniority covenant is no different from that
required to monitor the coordination covenant discussed above, it is clear that social welfare is
the same whether A simply uses a coordination covenant or if A is granted priority over creditor
B.  In either case, social welfare is improved relative to the no coordination equilibrium if and
only if  c v p q k L B ) 1 ( − ≤ .
One motivation for granting creditor A priority is the hope that it will improve its
incentives to monitor this covenant.  After all, since creditor A has a senior position, it has more
to lose if future loan agreements do not contain coordination clauses.  Indeed, when creditor A
                                                
18 Secured debt is an important exception that proves the rule.  When a creditor obtains a security interest in a
specific assets, it must file public notice of this action.  As a result, future lenders extend credit with complete
information about their relative standing with respect to the firm’s assets.  We discuss the impact of such security
arrangements later in this section.
19 This type of arrangement is known as “covenant priority.”Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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has seniority over B, it will monitor B’s contract as long as
k L v p q L c v p q A L B B L B − − ≤ − − − ] , min[ ) 1 ( ] 0 , ) 1 ( max[ ) 1 (. (16)
Comparing this inequality with (14) above, it is easy to see that A’s incentive to monitor this
covenant is improved when it has seniority.
Although A has a stronger incentive to monitor B’s contract when it has seniority, we
showed above that this incentive problem never exist when  A c θ < .  As a result, the improved
incentive to monitor that accompanies seniority does not improve on the ability of a coordination
covenant to effect coordination.  We summarize this fact in Proposition 4.
PROPOSITION 4:  Granting the first creditor seniority does not improve on the ability of a simple
coordination covenant to effect coordination.
In other words, granting seniority to creditor A achieves nothing that could not be achieved by a
coordination covenant.
C.  Seniority for the Second Creditor
The other possible way to use seniority to influence coordination incentives is for creditor
A to subordinate his claim to that of creditor B (and therefore implicitly coordinate as well).
Because his loan agreement is written before the firm contracts with creditor B, A’s commitment
to coordinate is fully credible just as it was in section 3.  Furthermore, because A has taken a
junior claim, it is impossible for the firm and creditor B to expropriate rents from A by refusing
to write a coordination clause in their loan agreement.  On the contrary, B has more incentive to
coordinate if he has seniority because he gets paid in full (if the firm has sufficient assets) before
creditor  A gets anything.  This is the same sharing rule that results if he chooses not to
coordinate, but it avoids the deadweight cost c.  It is straightforward to show that contractual
terms that make the second creditor senior to the first would achieve coordination without the
need of a bankruptcy law.
There is, however, a deadweight cost that arises if the first creditor subordinates his
claim.  This is the agency cost that arises out of the second lender and firm’s incentive to exploitCreditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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the existing subordinated claim.  This is commonly known as the “debt dilution” problem that
the “me-first” rule suggested by Fama and Miller (1972) is intended to resolve.
20
To see nature of this problem, imagine that the first creditor’s loan finances an initial
project, and that the second creditor’s loan finances a follow-up project.  If the first creditor
subordinates, the second creditor has little incentive to ensure that the firm invests its loan
wisely.  The reason is that B’s priority grants it first claim on the firm’s assets, which include the
firm’s existing assets.  This significantly reduces the impact of the firm’s follow-up investment
decision on the value of the second creditor’s claim.
Anticipating this behavior, the first creditor will either not accept a subordination clause,
or will charge the borrower a premium adequate to compensate for the subsequent moral hazard.
In the former case, coordination will not occur; in the latter case it will occur if and only if the
agency cost of the moral hazard is lower than the cost of an inefficient liquidation.  Thus,
granting the second creditor priority can resolve the coordination problem only in limited
circumstances. Here again, a resolution the coordination problem can be obtained privately by
granting the second creditor seniority, but only in special cases and only at the cost of
exacerbating the firm’s risk-shifting problems.  In the appendix we modify our model to
accommodate this contracting possibility and prove
PROPOSITION 5:  Granting the second creditor seniority can effect coordination only if the costs
of risk shifting are low relative to the costs of inefficient liquidation.
We conclude that seniority, whether granted to the first creditor or the second creditor,
resolves the coordination problem only in special cases, and even then, only at the expense of
monitoring costs or inefficient investment, respectively.  As a result, private contracts specifying
seniority cannot accomplish what a bankruptcy law that mandates coordination can.
D.  Security Interests
The final contracting device we consider is to grant one of the creditors priority through a
                                                
20 See Schwartz (1989, 1997a) and Triantis (1992) for detailed discussions of debt dilution.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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security interest in the firm’s assets.  A lien on the firm’s assets is a legal claim that cannot be
made subordinate to a future creditor’s claim.  Therefore, it provides a means of credibly
committing both creditors to coordinate their liquidation activities.  After all, if one creditor
cannot subrogate the other’s claim by running the firm, then both creditors will have an incentive
to coordinate liquidation.  In other words, collateral does not suffer from the same time-
inconsistency problem as covenants because a lien is enforceable, ex post. 
Perfecting a security interest, however, requires registering the claim with a
governmental authority with a precise description of the assets serving as collateral.
21  Clearly,
then, the extent to which assigning security interests can be used to eliminate the coordination
problem depends on the degree to which the firm’s assets are suitable to be collateralized.
Intangible assets, growth opportunities, illiquid assets, and assets that can be easily misused,
neglected, or absconded with will not be good candidates for collateral.  As a result, although
collateral may effect coordination in some cases, it cannot serve as a general replacement for a
bankruptcy system that mandates creditor coordination.
5.  Conclusion
We have developed a model in which ex post conflicts among creditors can occur, and
when they do they lead to an inefficient liquidation of the debtor.  When a debtor’s liabilities
exceed its assets, creditors will have private incentives to “run” the firm by staking claims on the
firm’s assets.  The resulting ad hoc liquidation of the assets that is required to meet individual
creditor’s claims leads to deadweight losses when compared to a coordinated liquidation.  Hence,
creditors are faced with a prisoners’ dilemma problem in which their equilibrium actions are not
Pareto efficient.
Our primary contribution is to show that this problem can exist even when the firm and
its creditors can anticipate these conflicts and can costlessly write enforceable clauses into their
contracts committing themselves to coordinate their liquidation activities.  This occurs because
creditors contract with the firm at different points in time.  Once the terms of the initial creditor’s
                                                
21 The public nature of this collateralization ensures that future creditors can be fully aware of the conditions under
which they can expect repayment of their loans.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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contract are determined, neither future creditors nor the firm may have the incentive to write this
clause in their loan agreements.
In addition, we have shown that other private solutions such as coordination covenants,
seniority covenants, or collateral offer only limited success in enhancing incentives to include
coordination clauses.  Although a coordination problem that cannot be solved through private
contracting does not afflict all firms in all circumstances, we have demonstrated that the
conditions in which it does occur are quite general.  On that basis, we argue that a bankruptcy
law is socially desirable because it forces creditors to commit to the very behavior to which they
would like to have committed in the first place.
One possible objection to our argument for the use of a mandatory bankruptcy system is
that we have ignored the costs of administering such a system.  If such administrative costs
outweigh the social gain we model, then private debt-collection remedies will be preferable,
despite the deadweight costs they entail.
Regardless of whether or not a bankruptcy law exists, however, the liquidation of a
debtor’s assets is costly.  These costs can be attributed to three separate aspects of a liquidation:
the cost of valuing the assets, the cost of  distributing the assets, and the efficiency of the manner
in which the assets are deployed.  It is this third cost that a mandatory bankruptcy system can
minimize.
What about the first two administrative costs?  We argue that the magnitude of these
costs—the valuation and distribution of assets—is unlikely to differ based on whether or not the
liquidation is public or private.  These costs are likely to be minimized, however, if liquidation is
handled in a coordinated manner, regardless of whether such coordination is effected through
private contracts or a public bankruptcy procedure.
22  Thus, when circumstances are such that
private contracts are unable to achieve coordination, we argue that these administrative costs will
be lower when liquidation is handled through a mandatory bankruptcy system.
23
                                                
22 The reason is that a coordinated liquidation avoids a costly duplication of these tasks.  Thus, the cost savings are
similar to those associated with monitoring firm projects in Diamond (1984).
23 This is not to suggest that current bankruptcy law in the United States handles these tasks in the most efficient
manner possible.  Rather, we are simply arguing that there is no reason, in principle, that a centralized bankruptcyCreditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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It is important to note that although our analysis does suggest that a bankruptcy law that
mandates ex post creditor coordination is socially beneficial, it makes no claims about the
relative desirability of specific features of bankruptcy law in the United States or in other
countries.  In our model, bankruptcy law is designed to achieve one primary purpose: to
coordinate the debt-collection activities of a firm’s various creditors.  To this end, our analysis
suggests that basic bankruptcy laws would include provisions such as the automatic stay and the
return of payments made to creditors on the eve of bankruptcy as mandated in the U.S.
bankruptcy code. More specific questions such as how to administer negotiations during a
reorganization, for example, are beyond the scope of this paper.
6.  Appendix
Proof of Result 1
We begin by proving sufficiency.  Suppose that  i c − < θ .  From expression (5) there are
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This inequality is equivalent to  L B A v L L > + , which holds by assumption.  On the other hand, if












proving that creditor i will always run the firm if  i c − < θ .
Next we show that if  i c − ≥ θ , creditor i will never run the firm (necessity).  First, note that
i c − ≥ θ  implies that  ) 1 ( c v L L i − > , since  ) ( 1 B A i i L L L + − = − θ  and  L B A v L L > + .  If
) 1 ( c v L L i − > , however, expression (5) implies that creditor i will run only if  i i c − = − < θ θ 1,
proving that creditor i will never run the firm when  i c − ≥ θ .  ♠
                                                                                                                                                            
system of the type envisioned by our model is necessarily more costly to administer than private debt-collection
efforts.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose first that creditor A included a coordination clause in his debt agreement.  If
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if B’s contract does not include this clause.  In these expressions, the CC superscript denotes the
case where both creditors include the coordination clause, while the CN superscript denotes the
case in which creditor A includes a coordination clause but creditor B does not; the superscripts
NC and NN are interpreted similarly.  Using these, firm profit will be higher when the
coordination clause is used if and only if
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This condition, however, is the mirror image of (5) in the text.  Thus, analogous arguments to
those used in the proof of Result 1 imply that the firm will require creditor B to use a
coordination clause if and only if  A c θ ≥ .
The second case to consider is that in which creditor A does not include a coordination
clause in his contract.  In this case,
q
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implying once again that the firm will require a coordination clause of creditor B whenever
                                                
24 Note that face value of creditor A’s debt is fixed at the time creditor B’s contract is written.  Thus, RA will be the
same in both of these expressions for firm profit.Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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Thus the firm will require a coordination clause of creditor B if and only if  A c θ ≥ .  ♠
Proof of Result 2
Consider first the case where  A c θ ≥ , so that the firm requires B to use a coordination
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if he does not.  Using these, we see that the firm will prefer A to use a coordination clause if
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which always holds.
If  A c θ < , the firm will not require B to use a coordination clause.  Thus,
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if he does not.  Using these, we see that the firm will prefer A to use a coordination clause if
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which once again must always hold.  ♠
Proof of Proposition 2
Immediate from expression (9) in the text.  ♠Creditor Conflicts in Bankruptcy
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Proof of Proposition 3
Immediate from the discussion in the text.  ♠
Proof of Proposition 4
Immediate from the discussion in the text.  ♠
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that the firm has two separate projects, each financed individually by one of the
creditor’s loans.  To simplify, we will assume that  B A L L =  and that the project financed by the
initial lender has a payoff of  H v 2
1  with probability q and a payoff of  L v 2
1  with probability 1 – q.
When the second lender arrives, the firm has two mutually exclusive projects that can be funded
with the second loan.  The first of these projects is identical to the initial project.  The alternative
project has a payoff of  H v′ 2
1  with probability q and a payoff of  L v′ 2
1  with probability 1 – q,
where  0
1 = ′ > > > ′ > +
−
L L H H L q
q
H v v v v v v .  Under these assumptions, the alternative project is
riskier and also has a lower (but perhaps positive) net present value.
Clearly, the firm will have an incentive to “shift risk” onto the creditors and invest in the
riskier project.  To capture the impact of a senior creditor’s incentive to dilute an existing
subordinated creditor’s claim, we make the following assumption:  If the first creditor
subordinates, then the second creditor dilutes and allows the firm to invest in the risky project; if
the first creditor does not subordinate, then both creditors take pro rata claims and the second
creditor, because it has significantly less incentive to dilute, will require the firm to invest in the
safe project.
Thus, the tradeoff that drives the level of social welfare is between the agency cost of the
risk shifting and the cost of inefficient liquidation.  Of interest, then, is the profit of the firm in a
coordination equilibrium in which the first creditor is subordinated, relative to the firm’s profit in
a non-coordination equilibrium.
Under this setup, if both creditors agree to use coordination clauses we have
q
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implying that firm profit under this scenario would be
B A











The firm will then prefer to effect coordination by making creditor B senior if this profit is higher
than that it earns in the no-coordination outcome, as measured by π ′  in expression (8) above.
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When  c exceeds this bound, the cost of risk shifting is lower than the cost of inefficient
liquidation that occurs without coordination.  As a result, the firm will have the first creditor
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